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International Joint Ventures in Industrial 
Gold Mining, Corporate Social Responsibility,
and Harm-Production in Sudan
Enrico Ille
Abstract: Violent conflicts in Sudan, especially those in Darfur in the 
early years of the new century, led state and non-state actors in the United 
States to exert heightened pressure on companies to divest from Sudan, 
or to prove that their activities in that country do not contribute to the 
conflicts. In this case study of La Mancha, a company involved in a gold 
mining joint venture in Sudan from 2006 to 2015, I examine whether and 
how it reacted publicly to this pressure. I trace how corporate social re-
sponsibility (CSR) for the continuation of harm-production was treated in 
its public statements, what conceptual gaps are perceptible in these state-
ments, and how they were (re)produced in US-based activist circles. On 
this basis, I highlight the selective acknowledgement of responsibility 
which is based on assessments of harm-production by external actors 
excluding those directly affected by it. More generally, the case study 
relates to debates on CSR in Africa’s extractive industries, especially with-
in the frame of complex business structures involving both state actors 
and foreign investors that make it difficult and nonetheless urgent to 
identify units of responsibility. I suggest that a communication disconnect 
during the process of identification can be adequately approached 
through a conceptualisation of this process as an “arena” of actors who 
relate to a common issue but not necessarily to each other. 
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Introduction
Large-scale, industrial, non-petroleum mining in present-day Sudan is 
mostly pursued by international joint ventures (IJVs) with Sudanese as 
major partners, many of them linked to the ruling elites or their support-
ers. This constellation is not unusual within today’s extractive industries 
in Africa, and it has important implications for the way that the involved 
corporations relate to conflicts in the areas they operate in – and, further, 
how far they can be held responsible for ones connected to their extrac-
tive activities. 
The operation of IJVs is, in general, strongly linked to the status 
formation and governance practices of domestic elites (Hearn 2015), as 
well as to legal regimes and to ethical demands in global business and in 
the foreign partners’ countries of registration. The composite character 
of IJVs confronts us with a significant obstacle in assigning responsibility 
and, subsequently, demanding accountability, which Ferguson formulat-
ed as the difficulty “to identify a unit of responsibility, in a fiendishly 
complex, multiply-layered and decidedly trans-national apparatus of 
harm-production” (Ferguson 2012: 560). 
The question of the responsibility and legal accountability of com-
panies becomes more relevant with the increasing impact of their activi-
ties. Confronted with possible legal action and reputational damage over 
their role in harm-production, companies’ decision whether and how to 
invest and participate in mining operations is positioned between ad-
dressing the situation (engagement) or contrariwise avoiding it (disen-
gagement). Many campaigns targeting corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) are also positioned between these extremes, and endeavour to 
define criteria for engagement and disengagement – namely, guidelines 
for situational discretion. 
The constructive engagement with volatile situations acknowledges 
a fundamental link between local residents’ well-being and community–
corporation relations, posing the question of how to best translate a 
general concept of CSR into actual local involvement and economic de-
velopment (Lange and Kolstad 2012; McElroy 2015). But, proponents of 
such an approach vary concerning their assessment of the quality of this 
link and the role of state governance. An affirmative stance often builds 
on some notion of business-for-development, meaning the claim that 
“the operation of core business on commercial terms […] can benefit 
poor people in developing countries” (Ashley 2009: 1). This argues for a 
coexistence of profit and societal benefits. Governments appear, in this 
line of argument, often as legitimate receivers of taxes and fees, being 
documented in transparency campaigns such as the Extractive Industry 
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Transparency Initiative (EITI). However, critical voices ask on whose 
terms “development” is defined (Gilberthorpe and Banks 2012), and 
what happens if continued corporate profit-orientation combines with 
the governmental de-prioritisation of local development – in the process 
effectively confirming the status quo. In spite of a nominal business-for-
development policy, CSR may assist, then, predatory power elites to 
cement their status against local resistance (Welker 2009; Rubbers 2013). 
Other critical observers refer to the danger of “corporate oxymorons” – 
such as “sustainable mining” – that “conceal the contradictions of capi-
talism and promote business as usual” (Benson and Kirsch 2010: 45–46; 
see also Kirsch 2012). 
Accordingly, there are advocates of unconditional disengagement 
for situations when profit-seeking corporations operate under the legal 
umbrella of autocratic, authoritarian regimes, as they cannot avoid sup-
porting these regimes and thus being complicit in their continuance. 
Organisations such as Global Witness demanded the avoidance of any 
partnership  
where there is reason to suspect that the local company’s benefi-
ciaries may include government officials who are taking advantage 
of their positions to enrich themselves (GW 2012: 30), 
or worse. In a similar way, slogans like “Peace through Commerce” have 
been answered by more pronounced stances being taken towards the 
question of: “At what point [does it become] impossible for a firm to 
remain engaged on the ground and still function as an ethical business?” 
(Westermann-Behaylo 2009: 417). 
This multitude of possible positions gives rise to interstitial spaces 
of CSR negotiation. In this article, I discuss such interstitial space 
through a case study from Sudan that demonstrates the phenomenon of 
the selective acknowledgement of responsibility – an instance that ad-
dresses only part of the complaints about a mining operation, while sim-
ultaneously excluding those people most affected by harm-production. 
This problem is more severe in situations where complainants addressing 
the same issues engage in different, disconnected communicative pro-
cesses, for example political pressure groups in North America and resi-
dents in mining areas in Sudan. Such a situation allows foreign compan-
ies operating in IJVs to deal with the former by formulating a response 
merely sufficient to ease the pressure, and with the latter by shifting 
responsibility to the residents’ state government and the IJV’s major 
partner, which often overlap. My main argument is that the identification 
of units of responsibility is, therefore, a derivate of how a mining opera-
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tion is contextualised within different communicative processes – which 
happens partially, situationally, and positionally. Disconnection existing 
between the processes intended to check and balance harm-production 
adds to the structural limitations of such identification of responsibility. 
The theoretical and practical implication here is that CSR should be 
approached in terms beyond – but not disconnected from – those that 
are established from specific positions such as “corporate spokesperson” 
or “non-resident activist.” 
I suggest here “arena” as a conceptual frame that captures a discur-
sive situation wherein actors relate to a common issue – a mining opera-
tion – but not necessarily to each other. It is, then, an instance of co-
constructive, but only partly cooperative, world-making – one that ex-
plicitly includes the researcher. The level of interconnection and cooper-
ation in such an arena says something about the quality and legitimacy of 
identifying responsibility among its constituents.1 
As an illustrative case in point, I will trace the concrete situation of 
La Mancha (LMA) – which was involved from 2006 to 2015 in the Ariab 
Mining Company (AMC) that operates the Hassaï gold mine in eastern 
Sudan. I examine in the case study whether and in what ways conflicts 
connected to gold mining in Sudan have been acknowledged in LMA’s 
public statements; it is thus an evaluation of the formulation of a corpor-
ate response that emerged out of legal and political challenges to such 
activities. My analytical focus is on how the company positioned itself, as 
a corporate actor, concerning both the business (profit) and the societal 
(ethics) aspects of its engagement in Sudan, and how far these differed 
from the identification of its behaviour by other actors involved in the 
scrutiny of its mining activities in Sudan. The analysis is based on LMA’s 
published documents and public corporate statements, while alternative 
perspectives have been derived from journalistic accounts, non-govern-
mental organisation reports, and a key person interview with a leading 
member of the oppositional Beja Congress, based in Port Sudan.2 
It will be shown not only that the communicative processes that the 
corporate response related to were distinctly disconnected from resi-
dents’ activism targeting the same issues, but also that this response dis-
appeared once direct political pressure from within the North American 
1 This terminology is borrowed from Strauss’s “social worlds” framework, and 
has been defined by Clarke and Star as “composed of multiple worlds organiz-
ed ecologically around issues of mutual concern and commitment to action” 
(Clarke and Star 2008: 113). 
2 Interview in Port Sudan, 28 February 2013, conducted in Arabic; translation by 
the author. 
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context subsided. This outcome was supported by the complex and 
changing ownership structure of LMA, and by the specific set-up of the 
mining operation itself – being conducted by an IJV with the Sudanese 
government, as the major partner. Such a structural arrangement provid-
ed the opportunity to shift responsibility conveniently between different 
frames of reference. In the presented case, this was supported by the 
business-oriented way in which United States-based activism towards 
CSR in Sudan was conducted – as no significant link to and cooperation 
with resident activists in Sudan was developed to challenge this conven-
ient shifting of responsibility. Accordingly, I suggest that the company’s 
engagement with the situation would have resulted in a much more in-
tensive and legitimate process if it was formulated on the basis of multi-
scalar politics surrounding the mine – and not on an abstract under-
standing of another area with a higher global geopolitical profile, namely 
Darfur. 
In general terms, the article connects to the debates on CSR in ex-
tractive industries that focus on a better translation of local demands into 
the circuits of public–private companies and mixed-property regimes. It 
follows one of the lines in these debates that Hilson has called the 
“[f]ailure to ‘connect’ with local populations” (Hilson 2012: 134), specifi-
cally addressing grievances that have been formulated somewhere else 
and thereby miss – or actively bypass – those of the affected populations 
themselves. The study is not based on intensive analysis of either the 
presented communicative processes by themselves or on actual harm-
production, but considers rather the conceptual and perceptual gaps 
between them – with the ultimate aim of highlighting the extent and 
nature of these disparities. In other words, it looks at the interstitial 
spaces between actors involved in CSR concerns around a mining site 
regarding communicative interconnections that did not occur. The study 
thus seeks to complement existing studies with a stronger focus on polit-
ical processes around extractive activities, such as contentious politics 
perspectives (Engels 2018), internal processes within mining corpor-
ations (Welker 2014), and the in-depth geopolitics surrounding specific 
mining sites (Luning and Pijpers 2017). 
The article starts with a short overview of foreign investment in 
gold mining in present-day Sudan, being followed by an outline of US-
based activism trying to pressure companies to acknowledge and re-
spond to the political implications of investment in Sudan. The subse-
quent case study of the AMC highlights different responses to LMA’s 
involvement with this company, and role in conflicts around the Hassaï 
gold mine. 
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Industrial Gold Mining in Sudan
Gold started to be of macroeconomic importance in Sudan only around 
2010, in particular after the independence of South Sudan in 2011 – 
when the precious metal became a focal point for the seeking of com-
pensation for oil revenues lost to the new state. This was all the more 
important as such revenues had been an essential part of Sudan’s budget, 
and, amid a parallel surge in artisanal gold mining, foreign and domestic 
investment in the industrial gold sector was hoped to be significantly 
increased. JVs for gold mining reach back to the late 1980s (Antonides 
1992), and the Sudanese government had tried – albeit with limited suc-
cess – to attract investment in the sector more extensively parallel to the 
oil boom in 1999; apparently, some Chinese companies had shares in 
gold mining JVs from at least the year 2000 (Mobbs 2002: 26.2). But a 
major “gold rush” started only after 2008, when the Sudanese govern-
ment publicly announced gold production as a new major source of non-
oil revenues (CRN 2010: 19–20), already before – and in clear anticipa-
tion of – South Sudan’s separation. While the early years of the new 
century saw a general decline in gold exports, which had totalled 10,594 
tons in 1999 (Yager 2003: 26.1), reported gold production and export 
increased dramatically in 2010 – while a first gold refinery was opened in 
September 2012, in Khartoum (Spittaels and Weyns 2014: 20). 
In an attempt to increase through foreign investment the presence 
of industrial mining in the overwhelmingly artisanal gold sector, the 
government had awarded by 2014 some 127 concessions – of which 10 
eventually went into production (IMF 2014: 44). Soon the Ministry of 
Minerals reported higher and higher numbers of reserves, seemingly as 
domestic- and investor-oriented promises of a better future; only overall 
production numbers increased and not the reported export levels, how-
ever. The question of what explains the gap between 73.3 t claimed gold 
production in 2014 and 37 t officially reported exports has been made 
part of the political scrutiny of Sudan’s gold sector (Kumar 2015: 4). 
In fact, the political economy of the sector is reflected by the lack of 
available public information on it. Most governmental announcements 
provide only superficial information, list company names or even only 
country names of alleged investors, and give general numbers of signed 
agreements. The relationship to specific mines or concessions can only 
be established if corporations themselves provide some kind of disclos-
ure. In other words, only those corporations that bring themselves ac-
tively into the public debate are represented in it, as there is no generally 
available official reporting on current mines and concessions. The effort 
to produce a general overview of ongoing industrial mining is, according-
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ly, strenuous. It is not the intention to give such an overview here, but 
the difficulty to produce it is nevertheless still a relevant issue. 
The secretive language around contracts, followed by fragmentary 
and sometimes contradictory public statements, shows a fluctuation 
between, on the one hand, a rhetorical “national interest” wherein – also 
to support claims of sovereignty – natural resources are presented as 
being “owned by the people” and, on the other, a string of contracts 
signed without public information, or say. Since there is almost no dis-
closure of information, the practice of agreements, specific incentives, 
and stipulations cannot easily be traced – and even general information is 
mostly given only on request, subject to bureaucratic discretion (USDS 
2015: 12). It has been highlighted that foreign investors “are often asked 
for bribes to establish businesses or undertake economic projects in 
Sudan” (USDS 2015: 5), and for the inclusion of favoured high-ranking 
members of the ruling National Congress Party (NCP), military, police, 
and national security in prominent positions of the obligatory JVs 
(USDS 2015: 6, 13). This situation corresponds with Sudan’s overall 
political economy, which is dominated by the  
market power exerted by more than 700 “regime companies”: 
some of them are owned directly by the state, others by security 
agencies and still others by Al-Ingaz leaders and regime cronies. 
(Verhoeven 2015: 210; for wider analysis, see 207–215; see also, 
Suliman 2007) 
This link between political and economic might, specifically the govern-
ing party’s prosperity and grasp on power, is not only well established 
but also protected by law (Sheikh 2003: 17); the extractive industries are 
organised along the same lines too (Elhashmi 2017; Chevrillon-Guibert 
2016). Foreign investors’ alleged support for this state of affairs is also 
behind threatened or actual attacks by several oppositional armed 
movements against installations permitted to be built only by the central 
government, with foreign workers having been repeatedly kidnapped 
from oil and other production sites (Sheikh 2003: 20; Patey 2014: 107–
111; USDS 2015: 14). Recent armed confrontations over such sites have 
occurred around gold and iron mines in the war-affected states of South 
Kordofan and Blue Nile (Spittaels and Weyns 2014), and also in North 
Darfur, where the leader of an – at least temporarily – oppositional 
armed group has openly threatened any industrial gold mining not legit-
imated by the local non-state administration (Ismail and Kumar 2013). In 
addition, the high ratio of non-concessional loans flowing from the Gulf 
States especially in the wake of Sudan joining the Saudi-led military cam-
paign against the Houthi movement in Yemen shows foreign investment 
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in Sudan to be far from business-only; there are, indeed, high political 
stakes at play. Especially for companies strongly associated with the US 
economy, this has made investment in Sudan a potentially image-threat-
ening endeavour. 
Investment and Divestment
A recent call for declaring any quantity of the precious metal from Sudan 
“conflict gold” (Kumar 2015) is the continuation of several US-based 
broad divestment campaigns that gained momentum after widespread 
violence broke out in Sudan’s western region Darfur in 2003. At some 
point, news coverage of the war in Darfur reached in the US a level that 
would trigger several campaigns with the broad aim of “doing something 
about it.” This was based on a perceived “link between oil money and 
Sudan’s military that has led activists to assert that foreign firms are indir-
ectly supporting the crisis in Darfur” (Westermann-Behaylo 2009: 427). 
Many of these campaigns were coordinated by the Sudan Divest-
ment Task Force (SDTF), a platform founded in 2006 by the private 
Genocide Intervention Network (GIN) – itself formed in 2004, to or-
ganise activists concerned about the atrocities in Darfur. SDTF’s Sudan 
Divestment Resource Guide argued for efforts “to force problematic 
companies to address the financial and social implications of their opera-
tions in Sudan” (SDTF 2008: 3). On the basis of the accusation that the 
Sudanese government instigated a genocide in Darfur, this was seen as 
an extension of US sanctions against that country – in place as a counter-
terrorism measure since 1997. Since the sanctions only targeted US com-
panies, influence on non-US ones was intended to be effected this way. 
The legal basis of these efforts was the 2007 Sudan Accountability and 
Divestment Act, which encouraged divestment from Sudan and forbade 
outright “federal contracts with companies that operate in Sudan’s oil, 
power, mineral and military sectors” (SDTF 2008: 3). 
Presenting itself as a comparatively balanced divestment model, the 
guide specified that only those business relationships are targeted that 
involve the government in any way, do not benefit disadvantaged popu-
lations significantly, and – even if both are given – do not address this 
through “a substantial business-practice policy” (SDTF 2008: 5). Most 
economic sectors were not targeted, based on the presumption that their 
“revenues do not go directly into the government coffers as they do 
from the oil and extractive industries” (Westermann-Behaylo 2009: 427). 
The director of the SDTF, furthermore, stressed that perceptible re-
sponses towards stakeholder engagement, meaning pursuing active CSR 
 International Joint Ventures 41 
practice, prevented the group from targeting a specific company, even 
encouraging “direct investment in the regions of Sudan that so desper-
ately need it” (Sterling 2009). Similar reactions were, for instance, the 
Sudan Engagement Group of the United Nations-backed Principles for 
Responsible Investment initiative, which argued for caution vis-à-vis “a 
country whose human rights record, weak governance, and history of 
violence is a subject of ongoing public and political concern” – but, 
rather than support radical divestment, it tried to understand how “to 
avoid activities that exacerbate or fuel instability and a negative business 
environment.”3 
In fact, the SDTF seems to have turned more and more into a ser-
vice for companies, rather than for the affected populations themselves – 
an impression supported by the eventual transformation of one of its 
central products, the Sudan Company Report, into a commercial venture. 
Being published with free access up to 2010, aided by Calvert Invest-
ments, it became part of the EIRIS Conflict Risk Network (CRN). This 
body publishes, against an annual subscription, the quarterly Sudan Com-
pany Report, explicitly with the aim to “inform its investor network about 
corporate actors and their exposure to conflict risk in Sudan” (EIRIS 
2015: 3). 
In any case, the SDTF and similar campaigns led to a whole infra-
structure of avoidance that had an impact on all foreign direct invest-
ment in Sudan – indirectly even on South and East Asian corporations 
that basically resisted pressure to divest. However, it has been argued 
that these campaigns not only achieved very little on the ground but they 
also lacked any significant engagement with the political opposition, 
affected communities, and with civil society in Sudan (Patey 2014: 161–
184; see also, Patey 2009). In addition, analytical efforts surrounding the 
campaigns mostly concentrated on the responses of corporations, the 
impact on their assets and performance, their domestic legal environ-
ment, and the like (e.g. Bechky 2009). This created a great wealth of 
material on how the 2007 Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act 
played out in the US, but – paradoxically – little analysis has been done 
on how those directly affected by extractive activities were, along with 
local activists, involved or not in these processes – and how far they 
benefited from them.  
3 These statements were published on the website of the group <www.unpri. 
org/sudanengagement/index.htm>, which disappeared as of 2014. A cached 
version can be found online at: <http://web.archive.org/web/2011121218162 
9/http://www.unpri.net/sudanengagement/index.html> (18 March 2016). 
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In the following case study, I illustrate how disconnectedness be-
tween different actors engaging critically in the same issues prevailed in 
the case of LMA’s involvement in the AMC. While a protective role 
towards affected communities was indeed a central element in LMA’s 
statements regarding its engagement in Sudan, its response to challenges 
was limited to counteracting the complaints coming from the North 
American context; resident activists in Sudan were ignored or diverted to 
the Sudanese government as the responsible partner, meanwhile. The 
case study thus not only addresses a gap in scientific analysis that corres-
ponds to the exclusive US focus of the involved companies and activists 
but also provides a critical perspective on the way political and economic 
environments were selectively acknowledged by a foreign operator of a 
gold mine in Sudan. 
Ariab Mining Company
AMC’s history dates back to the 1970s, and provides a singular case 
study for the kind of dynamics that are currently in the process of un-
folding in Sudan’s industrial mining sector. The gold mine it operated, 
Hassaï, was the only major industrial one producing the precious metal 
before the recent “gold rush.” These operations were actively targeted by 
the SDTF but processes of public communication around the AMC 
often took place in separate instances – with few intertextual references 
being made. 
In the following analysis, three kinds of communicative process will 
be juxtaposed. Apart from some recurrent basic elements, each one tells 
a different story about the effect that AMC had on the area in which it 
operated. The first concerns company–shareholder communication, 
which was informed by the pressure exerted by the divestment cam-
paigns; the second concerns company–general public communication, 
represented here by a policy paper and a journalistic report on the min-
ing camp; the third concerns community–company/community–state 
communication, which is derived from an in-depth interview with a local 
politician who represented for years communities’ protests and claims 
against the company in front of state authorities. While the first two had 
some overlap, the third represents a separate communication process – 
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General Background
The history of the AMC starts in the late 1970s, when the Total Com-
pagnie Minière (TCM) conducted a geological survey between 1977 and 
1980 – including in the Hassaï district of the locality Ariab – in coopera-
tion with Sudan’s Geological and Mineral Resources Department and the 
French governmental Bureau de Recherches Géologiques et Minières 
(BRGM). Following the survey, a JV – namely, the AMC – was founded 
in 1981,4 wherein the Sudanese Mining Corporation held a 60 per cent 
stake, TCM a 30 per cent one, and BRGM a 10 per cent one.5 
As of 1991, output had reached 982 kilograms. At the same time a 
model village was formed in the area, providing educational, health, and 
sanitary services – in addition to a general financial contribution being 
made by the company to the Red Sea state’s coffers. About 1,000 work-
ers were employed in 2001, 97 per cent of them Sudanese (GRAS 2001: 
18–19). At that point, the French company Compagnie Minière Or 
(COMINOR) held a 40 per cent share of AMC;6 the Sudanese govern-
ment held 56 per cent, while the other 4 per cent was held by an un-
named French engineering company (Mobbs 2002: 26.1; Yager 2004: 
27.1). Gold production had reached 5,565 t in 1999, and fluctuated 
around this value in the following years. In 2006, COMINOR’s 40 per 
cent stake was acquired by the Canadian company La Mancha Resources, 
in exchange for a 63.55 per cent stake in LMA. 
In 2010, LMA considered the possibility of expansion – especially 
through a new polymetallic concession in the Nuba Mountains, in central 
Sudan – while the Hassaï mine experienced a decrease in its production 
4 The area covered by the joint venture was about 34°30’ – E 36°30’ to 18°15’ – 
N 19°20’, about 220 kilometres west of Port Sudan. Preparations at Hassaï led 
in 1987 to the commencement of operations, and in 1988 to a first output of 
100 kilograms of gold. The whole Ariab locality was estimated to hold 1.8 mil-
lion t ore with about 7.2 gram/t gold (Antonides 1992: 252). 
5 In the same year, the BRGM published together with the Geological Depart-
ment and the Saudi-Sudanese Red Sea Joint Commission a 1:2,000,000 geologi-
cal map of Sudan. In October 1990, the Ministry of Energy and Mining and the 
BRGM signed a shareholders’ agreement to split the revenues from the mining 
according to a ratio of 60 per cent to the Ministry of Finance and 40 per cent to 
the French partner. 
6 On 31 July 2000 the French company Compagnie Générale des Matières Nu-
cléaires (incorporated in Areva in 2001, since 2006: Areva NC) bought 
COMINOR through its subsidiary Compagnie Française de Mines et Métaux. 
This enterprise was, via LaSource Campagnie Minière SAS, a subsidiary of 
BRGM and Normandy Mining Limited. Part of the deal was a 40 per cent equi-
ty interest in AMC (Areva 2000). 
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due to the exhaustion of near-surface deposits (Yager 2014: 40.1). The 
year of the highest exports from Sudan and the opening of the country’s 
first gold refinery, 2012, saw a crucial new development as LMA and the 
other non-Sudanese shares in AMC were acquired by Weather Invest-
ments II SARL of the Egyptian Sawiris family (Yager 2015: 41.1). LMA 
obtained its new seat in Luxembourg, probably for tax purposes, and 
negotiations were initiated to extend its share in AMC to 51 per cent 
(LMA 2012).7 
However, a press release on 20 April 2015 disclosed that the com-
pany “[o]pportunistically sold its minority 44% interest,” receiving USD 
100 million for it. The explicit rationale was that: 
In light of the current market conditions and the inherent risks in 
financing and developing Hassai’s projects, La Mancha […] seized 
this opportunity to remove its geopolitical overhang and better 
positioning itself to pursue high-quality African acquisition oppor-
tunities. (LMA 2015) 
General Concerns
When the French government disconnected from AMC in 2000 by selling 
its shares, public attention placed on foreign oil companies in Sudan – 
especially the Canadian Talisman Energy Inc. – had already reached a 
peak, and triggered a public investigation by the Canadian government 
itself (Mobbs 2002: 26.1). Although it had no legal consequences at that 
point, while Talisman sold its stakes in 2003, the case became one of the 
standard examples for the limits of voluntary business ethics as well as 
difficulties to exert pressure on multinational enterprises complicit in 
human rights violations (Simons and Macklin 2014). In general, Canad-
ian companies were less vulnerable to legal action concerning Sudan, as 
Canada did not follow to the same extent the US sanctions; rather, it only 
established trade restrictions for arms and UN-sanctioned individuals. 
In any case, LMA – or actually, its involvement in AMC – was 
quoted by the director of the SDTF as one of the cases of successful 
engagement with a company (Sterling 2009). The measures said to have 
caused the removal of the company from the status “scrutinized” were:  
7 In November 2013, a company workshop was held in Paris to discuss future 
projects; in October 2014, Sudan was described in a corporate presentation as a 
strategically essential part of the company’s development into a mid-tier pro-
ducer with about 15 t annual output, prepared by the formation of the La Man-
cha Sudan Exploration Company in 2013 and a production plan running up to 
2019 (LMA 2014). 
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1. a meeting with the Sudanese Minister of Energy and Mining to 
show concern about developments in Darfur;  
2. a moratorium on further investments until the full establishment of 
a UN–African Union peacekeeping force in Darfur (UNAMID);  
3. a contribution to a humanitarian project in Darfur;  
4. the initiation of an independent evaluation of these CSR measures, 
in addition to of labour policy, environmental protection, and com-
pany security standards.  
The CSR measures were reviewed in May 2008 by the law firm Foley 
Hoag LLP, which the CRN report described as a “law firm with a cor-
porate social responsibility practice that has done human rights monitor-
ing around the world” (CRN 2010: 195). The report failed to add that 
the same firm was the legal counsel for Talisman against the claims of 
Sudanese communities themselves. The relevance of this detail lies in the 
fact that Talisman had extracted oil from an embattled region between 
northern and southern Sudan from the end of the 1990s through the 
beginning of the new century, and was then targeted by a divestment 
campaign of “an alliance of African, North American and European 
Christian, anti-slavery, and human rights advocates” (Idahosa 2002: 234). 
Talisman’s line of defence, as offered in a later court case too, was built 
on the three claims that: its operations had nothing to do with violent 
conflicts; its operations were economically beneficial to the region’s 
population; and, as a commercial enterprise, it had no political account-
ability in another sovereign state – “a moral division of labour between 
politics and business” (Idahosa 2002: 235). A very similar line of defence 
was now formulated for LMA too; in a critical review of the company’s 
CSR measures and the description of the firm, such a prior history of 
support given to corporate and governmental claims in Sudan against 
communal interests should arguably have played a role – or at least poses 
the question why it was not included at this point. 
The CRN maintained some critical comments, such as regarding the 
absence of a reference to human rights in the formulated policies, as – 
apart from a one-time assessment – “there is no information available on 
whether respect for such rights is integrated into company practices” 
(CRN 2010: 196). Apart from that, all measures were tentative and vol-
untary without any enforceable commitment; the extension of invest-
ments in 2012 despite UNAMID and the Government of Sudan being in 
open conflict over the operational limitations of the former makes this 
point quite clear. This also invites the question: On what basis were these 
proclaimed steps considered a sufficient response? 
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The company’s main public documentation of its CSR efforts was 
its publication Policy on Ongoing Operations and Investment in Sudan (LMA 
2007), whose formulations were also used in the usually one-page “Social 
Responsibility” section in corporate presentations and reports. It worked 
with the premise that international attention for the “strife” in Darfur 
was informing a “responsibility to monitor the situation and measure the 
pertinence of [LMA’s] presence in the country” (LMA 2007: 1), which 
was invariably concluded to be beneficial to the economic development 
of the Sudanese people. Corresponding to this premise, the document 
started with a short outline of armed conflict in Darfur – carefully de-
scribing the rebels’ claims of negligence and oppression, subsequent 
attacks on the government, and the according military response by the 
government. The short description ended with a note on UN Security 
Council Resolution 1769 demanding a UN–AU hybrid force, the later 
UNAMID, with a Chapter VII mandate to secure peace in the area. The 
reference provided to support this latter point was the website of the GIN. 
After the main data on the start of operations, production figures, 
and forecasts, the workforce is numbered at about 1,400 – with 1,219 
local workers, 185 contractor employees, and 14 expatriates. Describing 
the mine as “vital to the survival of the surrounding villages” (LMA 
2007: 3–4) and as the only industrial economic activity in a 100 km ra-
dius, the region eastern Sudan was characterised as food insecure, poor, 
and vulnerable to complex emergencies. Local employees were shown to 
benefit from having living quarters in the mining camp, when not living 
in nearby villages, and earning double the average Sudanese income – 
four times the minimum wage. 
Claiming to be proactive with its measures, the policy paper defined 
as its aim “to protect the interests of [its] shareholders while ensuring a 
responsible approach to Sudan’s complex situation” (LMA 2007: 4). This 
took the form of adding two criteria of self-evaluation to the protection 
of profits: no contribution to the humanitarian crisis in Darfur and being 
of benefit for the people of Sudan. The way that these criteria were ana-
lysed indicates a very specific audience being addressed by the paper, 
with several aspects and actors accordingly being excluded. 
Humanitarian Concerns
Concerning the violent conflict in Darfur, the document acknowledged 
complicity in revenue-generation for the Sudanese government as a party 
to these events, but pointed out LMA’s status as a minority partner – 
which implied here the lack of control over the redistribution of most of 
the revenues. The strong counterargument given to the proposed poten-
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tial sale of shares was that the Sudanese government, according to the 
shareholders’ agreement, would then be able to control 96 per cent of 
the mine, which would increase its revenues (LMA 2007: 4–5). In other 
words, the generation of revenues by the mine was treated as a given. 
Hence a partial reduction of the government’s share – even if for the 
benefit of a foreign investor – gave complicity a positive connotation. 
While it was mentioned that at least USD 120,000 would be given to a 
non-profit organisation active in the Darfur area (LMA 2007: 9), the 
annual report to shareholders for 2007 only made a general reference to 
the policy as part of the responsibilities that came with “new-found in-
ternational producer status” (LMA 2008: 3). In spite of the claim that 
these would be detailed in the report, none of the activities in Sudan can 
be found in it – nor in subsequent reports either. 
Another noteworthy aspect is the exclusion of issues obviously 
connected to this complicity, namely the payment of taxes and the scru-
tiny of public finances that this calls for. As can be traced through 
LMA’s annual reports, there was a constant change and negotiation of 
payable taxes throughout the years of operation, including zakah – a 
wealth redistribution tax (for details on gold taxation, see: UNCTAD 
2015: 17–18; IMF 2013: 12–20). The payment of taxes could thus have 
been taken up as an issue of social responsibility, especially given that  
Sudan’s public sector is perceived as one of  the most corrupt in the 
world, ranking 173 out of  175 nations in the 2014 Transparency 
International (TI) Corruption Perceptions Index. (USDS 2015: 
14)8  
However, not being pressed within the frame of the divestment cam-
paigns it was not made an issue here either. 
The focus on Darfur facilitated this tendency towards only partial 
disclosure. The most pronounced feature of this focus is the seeming 
equivalence between “Sudan” and “Darfur” that it articulated. Darfur – 
and not the immediate region around the mining operation – as a per-
manent point of reference was stressed in the policy paper by describing 
the site as “some 1400 km northeast of the Darfour [sic] region” (LMA 
8 Although Sudan is nominally part of regional initiatives, it has stayed away from 
global transparency ones such as EITI. After the formation of the Sudanese 
Transparency Organization in April 2014, followed by the ratification of the 
UN Anticorruption Convention in September 2014 (USDS 2015: 15), the ac-
cess to information on public corruption issues has not visibly increased; on the 
contrary, reporting in the public media – especially newspapers – is actively 
blocked by the National Intelligence and Security Service. 
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2007: 3). Indeed, gold mining in Darfur had become a political issue as 
well – but so had the war in the Nuba Mountains too. Since the docu-
ment had been created before the concession in the Nuba Mountains 
was acquired, that area was of course not mentioned; it was described in 
the 2010 CRN report as a “concern” (CRN 2010: 194), however. Yet the 
company’s public statements never referred to the war that broke out in 
the region in June 2011, and when the sale of LMA by Areva was in full 
swing in April 2012 the corporate statements only addressed the concern 
of violence between Sudan and South Sudan around Heglig, an oilfield 
situated on the border between the two, and stressed that its own opera-
tions were far away and not affected. The only other stipulated concern 
was the ongoing negotiations over who would hold a controlling interest 
in the mine (Lazenby 2012). 
What weighs much more heavily is that up to 2006 eastern Sudan 
was itself affected by violent conflicts, whose underlying grievances were 
only seemingly and unsustainably addressed by the 2006 Eastern Sudan 
Peace Agreement; this was not mentioned. This disconnection of the 
mine from its actual environment was striking, since mining concessions 
given without local consultation and the insufficient redistribution of 
wealth generated by the activity were among the crucial issues behind 
these conflicts (Young 2006: 595; Pantuliano 2006: 711). In fact, one of 
the major regional political parties, the Beja Congress, has actively ques-
tioned the company’s conduct – especially after that party became part 
of the National Assembly in 2007. In an interview with a former general 
secretary of the Beja Congress and member of parliament from 2007 to 
2010,9 he stated that the exact nature of the company’s activities were 
unclear from the very beginning. It seemed to him, up to 2013, to be a 
French company that extracted gold and brought it all directly to France, 
an impression changed only by the conversation with myself during the 
interview. 
After several unsuccessful protests against the lack of information 
about the mine, a Beja Congress delegation eventually visited it – first in 
2004 then again in 2007, and confirmed the suspicion that substantial 
gold production was taking place. The MP noticed that none of the rev-
enues or other information appeared in budget reports presented to 
parliament, neither between 2007 and 2010 nor in any of the preceding 
years. A critical inquiry was answered by then minister of finance, cAwad 
al-Jaz, with the claim that this concerned only negligible amounts. This 
9 Interview in Port Sudan, 28 February 2013, conducted in Arabic; translation by 
the author. 
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contradicted the fact that the gold revenues were used as collateral dur-
ing the construction of a pipeline between the Unity Oilfield and 
Bashayer Sea Port in Port Sudan, finished in 1999, and that gold was 
praised as a new hope immediately after the separation of the two Sudans – 
at a time when the AMC was still the only major producer. In fact, even 
when gold production decreased between 2004 and 2008 by 54 per cent 
(Yager 2010: 38.1), exports had still in 2005 a value of USD 63.6 million 
(Yager 2007: 37.1) – and remained until 2008 above 6 t according to 
information published annually by the Central Bank of Sudan, but ap-
parently not accessible to the MP. 
Neither the immediate context of political conflicts nor interaction 
with specific claimants against the AMC appeared in LMA’s 2007 paper – 
or, indeed, later public communication. The relevant focus seemed to be 
on proving both no direct involvement in but still a “general concern” 
with Darfur, as this was the only issue effectively raised by the divest-
ment campaigns. All other concerns were translated into the claimed 
benefits of the mine for the local population, the “Beja tribe.” 
Local Concerns
This translation represents the amalgamation of a wide range of perti-
nent issues – recruitment and labour policy, regional development, envir-
onmental impact – into the situation of one ethnically defined group of 
beneficiaries, “the Beja.” The “marginalized Beja tribe” was depicted as 
suffering from “the absence of government subsidies and [the] complete 
withdrawal of public support in the social sector” (LMA 2007: 5), thus 
being limited to an existence as urban poor – now saved by the econom-
ic opportunities offered by the AMC. In fact, the established line of 
argument explicitly described the Sudanese government as failing in its 
responsibilities towards its citizens, for which LMA’s presence and influ-
ence functioned as a remedy. The perspective of the political opposition, 
which seemed non-existent here, contradicted the latter part of this ar-
gument, and the opportunistic 2015 sale of a holding stake to the same 
government suggested that its failure was not a significant concern any-
more. 
The proposed way to help the Beja was by equal opportunity em-
ployment, general training programmes, and on-the-job training. Of the 
workers, 603 were from Beja villages around the mine; the fact that some 
achieved managerial positions alongside 44 per cent of the mine workers 
being promoted in the years after the project’s inauguration was taken as 
proof of non-discrimination. Because even the lowest placed on the 12 
existing employment levels were shown here to receive twice the mini-
 50 Enrico Ille 
mum wage – in contradiction to the aforementioned previous statement 
of four times in the same document – this employment opportunity was 
argued to represent “a significant proportion of the region’s economic 
activity” (LMA 2007: 6). 
However, compartmentalised employment was one of the key com-
plaints that the Beja Congress received from local residents – who 
claimed to be hired only for the lowest kinds of job while even drivers 
and other semi-skilled workers were brought from outside the region, 
and graduates from regional universities ignored. Their statements also 
denied the existence of training facilities or related programmes for staff. 
However this criticism did not result from a general hostility to the pres-
ence of foreign corporations or management, but the demand of reci-
procity for the extraction of “their” resources.10 In this sense, employ-
ment of the “local” Muhammad Abu Fatima as general director of the 
AMC was acknowledged, just as much as the continuing employment of 
drivers and the like from the other federal states was criticised.11 
Following its own definition of what development is about, the 
corporation pointed out a Regional Development Fund that allowed the 
establishment of “seven schools, one medical clinic, improvements to 
the local water and power supply, and transportation and communica-
tions services” (LMA 2007: 6), benefitting about 10,000 Beja people. The 
fund was said to have been established under Areva, and accumulated 
until 2007 USD 2.55 million; in 2007, the company’s contribution to it 
was said to be USD 300,000 – or 4 per cent of overall profits. Further-
more, “[i]n 2006, AMC distributed a total of 300 tonnes of flour, 60 
tonnes of sugar, 60,000 boxes of milk, 3.7 tonnes of laundry detergent, 
and 6 tonnes of soap” (LMA 2007: 7) to the surrounding population. It 
was stressed a number of times that if only the Sudanese government 
was in charge then probably no such benefits would ever have been 
established. 
In the view of the MP, overall only USD 200,000 was paid – and 
only in reaction to their protests to the government. Subsequent to the 
lack of information about ongoing production, it was also unclear what 
10 The MP contrasted the situation with the German company Strabag, which had 
built a major road in the Red Sea state and trained its workers for certification 
useful for their future hiring (mentioned in Lawton 1979). 
11 The general director’s focus on the AMC’s identity as a Sudanese company 
after April 2015, and the expected increase of production based on this  
“Sudanisation,” supports the impression that the operation is not treated pri-
marily as forming a part of the region that the gold and other natural resources 
are extracted from (Sudan Vision 2015). 
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percentage of revenues from natural resource extraction this amount 
represented. However, rather than being about amounts of money uni-
laterally paid by the company, the relevant contention was regarding the 
perpetuation of the lack of political accountability of public organs that 
was supported – or at least not challenged – by this arrangement: while 
the money was intended for the model village, Bir al-cAjim, and for its 
surroundings, it was in fact taken by the Red Sea state without clear use 
for citizens. Ariab remained among the poorest regions in Sudan, without 
electricity, tap water, good schools, or thriving settlements. The model 
village, visited by the MP in 2004 as a Beja Congress representative and 
in 2007 with a delegation under the leadership of a presidential advisor, 
had only to show for itself an empty hospital, a school building used as 
living space, and a company that paid salaries without work for local 
leaders. 
Parliament and civil society were replaced in the paper’s construc-
tion of the social environment of the mine with, instead, a unified tribal 
territory under a unified tribal leadership. In some way, this correspond-
ed to socio-economic and political misunderstandings reproduced also in 
other contexts. The only journalistic report allowed from inside the min-
ing camp, which was produced in 2009 by a team of the news channel 
France 24 (Aubouard and Bittar 2009), questioned LMA’s presence as 
being a contradiction between French civil values and a French company – 
namely, Areva – profiteering from a country experiencing large-scale 
violent conflict – dubbed genocide. The mine’s earlier history was also 
geopolitically contextualised, per France’s stable relationship with the 
Sudanese government under the Sorbonne-educated Hassan al-Turabi 
up to the end of the 1990s. However, apparently based only on a one-
day stay on-site, the documentary failed to grasp the complications of the 
representation involved in the mine’s local presence.12 The environment 
of the mine was described as a “desert” inhabited by “the Beja,” and an 
interview quoted “the tribal leader,” called cumda, who presented the land 
as his – living himself a nomadic life “as was normal in the past.” 
From a wider perspective, the cumda was not a representative of the 
whole region – or even of all communities around the mine – but part of 
a political system of representation between a central government and its 
perceived peripheries. Apart from the fact that “Beja” is a summary term 
for millions of people within dozens of groupings living in Sudan, Eri-
12 A short reference to everyday conflicts over water and grazing issues in sur-
rounding communities, in which the expat technical supervisor appeared as the 
arbitrator, was not followed up on, to show what kinds of conflict these were 
and who exactly was involved. 
 52 Enrico Ille 
trea, and Egypt, being subject to ethno-politics, as with most tribal des-
ignations in modern Sudan, the journalists’ – and, more importantly, 
LMA’s – assessment lacked serious consideration of the multiple ways in 
which livelihoods and economic politics in the region play out. How the 
company was entangled in large-scale conflicts over land and the right to 
make use of it were also ignored (Manger 1996; Calkins 2014; Pantuliano 
2014). 
Instead of acknowledging and addressing this entanglement, LMA’s 
paper turned to “international standards” as a claimed safeguarding of 
best practices. Regarding worker health and safety, international stand-
ards were cited by way of example – here with the Barrick Gold Corpor-
ation in African mines as the point of reference. Lost Time Injury Rate 
and Total Medical Injury Rate were cited to prove best practices, to-
gether with the picture of a worker close to a furnace wearing a hood 
with a face-shield opening, high-temperature gloves, and otherwise 
seemingly wool or linen clothes. It was also said that “STAR” environ-
mental standards were followed – an acronym neither broken down nor 
explained in the paper – and that an internal investigation of Areva had 
supported this positive assessment. Environmental concerns were cov-
ered as well since LMA “brings a Canadian/European perspective” to 
the board and management, especially because there was no Sudanese 
national environmental regulation or standard for the mining industry 
(LMA 2007: 8). 
But there was no clear statement given on what exactly was as-
sessed, or how. Considering the environmental and other CSR track 
record of Canadian mining companies (CCSRC 2009), the reference to a 
“Canadian perspective” seems not to hold much value by itself; in fact, it 
has been pointed out that a “number of large Sudanese-owned corpora-
tions have active and full CSR programs that compare favorably with 
what one would see in the U.S.” (USDS 2015: 12). Related governmental 
statements and activities only target so-called traditional – not industrial – 
mining, a limited view on environmental concerns supported by the 
dominant international organisations as well (AfDB, OECD, UNDP, 
and UNECA 2012: 5, AfDB, OECD, and UNDP 2014: 4). The claim 
that no national legislation exists is simply false, as Sudan has had an 
environmental protection law since 2001 – while current laws on mining 
go back to the Mines and Quarries Act 1972, updated and amended in 
2007, 2010, and 2013 (Ille and Calkins 2013). 
Once again, Beja Congress grievances paint a very different picture. 
After consultation with miner unions in South Africa and France about 
occupational and environmental safety regulations for open pits, the 
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delegation sent to the mine noted the usage of potassium cyanide on the 
slurry (derived from grinded ore) that was piled up on uncovered soil, 
the unprotected tailings of mining waste, and – being confirmed by the 
technical supervisor of the mine – an absence of any instruments to 
measure environmental impact on soil, water, and similar.13 At the same 
time, they observed in the mountainous areas close to the mine darkened 
soil and malformed trees, and dried wells that had had a long history of 
feeding oases – for instance Bir al-cAjim, where the model village was 
located. Residents reported an increase in respiratory and skin diseases 
and subsequently frequent hospital visits, without medical studies or 
even statistics being initiated as a response. Since no working hospitals 
or even emergency transport services were operational in the area, at 
least in 2007, subsequent deaths started to be accepted by the residents 
as God’s will (‘amr Allah). The Beja Congress, however, saw its general 
distrust in the government’s performance as being hereby vindicated, 
and accused the company of having reacted to these developments by 
paying bribes to officials to buy their silence. 
Between humanitarian and “local” concerns, the identity of the 
company was thus variably represented as a JV mostly controlled by the 
Sudanese government and contrariwise as a JV operating according to 
international standards. The former defined the limits of the foreign 
partner’s political accountability; the latter established the extent of the 
domestic partner’s social and environmental responsibility. This was 
made possible by the conclusion of an arrangement that secured a major-
ity of revenues for the Sudanese government, but left all operational 
responsibility to the “minor” foreign partner.14 At the same time, LMA 
used its status as “international partner” also as an argument for its pres-
ence on-site. Maintaining an international presence in the mine was 
claimed to secure the application of “international ‘best practice’ stand-
ards for worker health and safety and environmental management” 
(LMA 2007: 5), and also to maintain the alleged benefits to the region’s 
population – which were thus expected to be withdrawn if only the fed-
eral government was involved. In this defence of LMA’s revenue-gener-
ating complicity with the – explicitly admitted – continuing harm-
production by the Sudanese government, there appears to be no contra-
13 LMA was not a signatory to the International Cyanide Management Code or 
the Canada-based International Council on Metals and the Environment. 
14 The mine had the same Belgian supervisor from 1992 to 2013, lending this 
aspect continuity amid changes on the level of company ownership and man-
agement. 
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diction between the claim of having limited influence as “minority” part-
ner and that of possessing strong influence as “international” partner. 
Conclusion
This article has examined the corporate response to different challenges 
of the company La Mancha’s (LMA) involvement in mining operations 
in Sudan (2006–2015) through the Ariab Mining Company (AMC). This 
was an international joint venture (IJV) that had the Sudanese govern-
ment as the major shareholder, and that dominated industrial gold min-
ing in Sudan for most of the 1990s and first decade of the new century. 
While expat employees were central to managing the actual operation of 
its mine up to 2015, when AMC became a purely Sudanese company, the 
IJV’s ownership structure changed several times during that period. 
The article is based on a general concern about assessments of 
whether a company and/or investor is contributing to harm-production 
when it is part of an IJV that includes members or supporters of pur-
portedly harm-producing regimes as major partners. In the politico-eco-
nomic environment of this operation, the extraction of natural resources 
was highly contested, both violently and non-violently, and the participa-
tion of government officials or regime supporters inevitably carried a 
conflictual element into the IJV’s existence and presence on the ground. 
While its concession represented a legal, territorial claim to pursue gold 
mining, the actual extraction process was surrounded by numerous coun-
terclaims and was confronted with the necessity for LMA to defend itself 
on paper against suggestions of illegitimacy (for the contextual argument 
here, see Calkins and Ille 2014; Ille and Calkins 2013). 
Put under pressure in the US to develop a clear position concerning 
ongoing conflicts in Sudan, LMA developed a policy paper that has been 
critically analysed here. Two central aspects came out of this scrutiny: 
The first is that the Sudanese government featured as – economically and 
politically – the major partner, but minor operational decision-maker, 
which facilitated the delinking of these roles. Meanwhile, LMA’s public 
statements suggested it had a dominant role for the direction that the 
AMC’s performance and CSR practices take, implicitly claiming these to 
be operational considerations. The second aspect was the non-existent – 
or at least imperceptible – relationship between public statements of 
LMA in reaction to divestment campaigns in the US and the political 
processes around, and active protest against, the AMC in Sudan itself. 
Not only the focus on Darfur – a region far from the mining area, but 
prominently represented in global media – but also the absence of 
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recognition of political, social, and environmental problems directly 
related to its conduct indicated that LMA’s public relation efforts en-
gaged with North American and European audiences, activists, and 
shareholders – and not with the very people that were supposed to bene-
fit from its CSR measures. It was also shown that North American activ-
ists, specifically the Sudan Divestment Task Force, seemed to have ac-
cepted this focus, as no active effort was made to work together with 
resident activists in Sudan. 
This was, arguably, a general characteristic of a number of different 
Sudan divestment campaigns, and their envisaged interventions in Sudan’s 
political struggles. In an attempt to not appear anti-market or anti-invest-
ment per se, the movement was caught in an  
uncritical embrace of neoliberal-led capitalism [that] led to the 
embedding of these struggles into, and thus the reproduction of, 
market rule, or […] marketisation of social justice. (Soederberg 
2009: 212)  
In consequence, a complex conflict situation was often reduced to mass 
media-derived simplifications that did not do much to connect to con-
flict actors and dynamics in Sudan (see also, Ille 2016). 
There was thus a fundamental disconnect between activism that 
tried to discover and pressurise transnational culprits, such as the Sudan 
divestment campaigns, the inner workings of transnational public–
private joint ventures, such as the AMC, and the alleged beneficiaries of 
both, “the Sudanese people” or “local communities,” who were not 
involved as significant participants in the campaigns or in the public–
private decision-making processes. The combination of vague structures 
of responsibility and selective acknowledgement of it by those put under 
scrutiny seemed both to benefit from and to play a crucial role for the 
existence of this disconnectedness – and, with it, the increased difficulty 
to assess harm-production. This is of special importance within the 
frame of present debates on how to assign responsibility and demand 
accountability vis-à-vis harm-production by complex transnational 
commercial entities, such as IJVs in Africa’s extractive industries. As 
such, it calls for critical studies that provide new connections rather than 
merely reproduce existing fragmentation. 
What I highlight here is the importance of how a mining operation 
is contextualised, especially concerning its construction of a “local com-
munity.” In its economic argument, the discussed policy paper followed 
the concept of “growth poles” that sees large-scale mines as catalysts of 
local economic development – a concept by now well established among 
sub-Saharan extractive industries. The labour-related points may even 
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represent an application of “local content,” in that ostensibly the resident 
population was made a significant part of the workforce (Hilson, forth-
coming). Hilson argued, however, that the former policies fall short in 
parallel with the regional government’s own failure to receive and/or use 
revenues in this sense. In addition the case has shown that the concept 
of “local” can be deployed merely as an updated version of colonial 
notions of “tribe,” by deleting structural relations and representational 
politics in favour of an equalised social community. In fact, the self-ar-
ticulated defence of the company’s interest in the continuation of opera-
tions, through alliances with both national government elites and a spe-
cific section of local power ones, reminds us of the dynamics observed 
by Welker (2009), and emphasises the question of how the operation is 
contextualised and its “local population” defined. 
I contend that a critical review of CSR has to acknowledge – but 
not accept – the corporate frame. What has been shown here is that the 
divestment campaign activists effectively accepted such a frame, even if 
they formulated their aims in terms of communal well-being. The pre-
supposition that a review of a company’s performance can take place 
without a monitoring system that includes those constantly exposed to it 
shows a cognitive set-up that comes across as deeply paternalistic. This 
may be – in abstract terms – a variation of known asymmetries in 
North–South relations and, more generally, of representational practices. 
But the interesting twist here is that the non-represented oppositional 
voices were not some isolated communities, whose lack of interconnec-
tion with “the world” lies behind their disconnection from these cam-
paigns. As the details of visits by non-Sudanese unions showed, there 
were alternative networks that nevertheless failed to become relevant to 
either component of the JV. 
The balance between economic gains, local employment, and harm-
production is arguably supposed to be the result of a negotiation wherein 
those who may have a claim to economic benefits as local residents and 
those who are directly affected by harm-production should have a signif-
icant voice. This normative argument concerns already the first step of 
such a negotiation, which is the definition of those who are to be given a 
chance to even participate. The present case has shown multiple layers of 
exclusion in this regard, not just by governmental and corporate actors 
but also by US-based activists. 
My main reflection here is the relativity of the response dimension 
of responsibility, which requires someone asking for a response and 
someone giving it. Selective discursive responses are reflected here not 
by simply ignoring “local people,” but by establishing a contextualisation 
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for oneself that selects – and thereby implicitly excludes – certain of the 
existing questioners. This communicative omission was facilitated both 
by the mixed property regime and discursive disjunction. The theoretical 
consequence is that an analytical emancipation from this process has not 
only to add in those silenced voices, but to shift the centre – or even 
shape – of the exchange. This is possible, for instance, by focusing on 
shared objects of negotiation, such as a mining operation, and by ques-
tioning existing groupings as a seductive status quo.  
It seems conceptually fruitful to think of this in terms of an arena 
wherein actors relate to the same issue but not necessarily to each other, 
and have the same directionality to their concerns. While they were relat-
ed to the same mining operation, the divestment campaign that had 
targeted political discourses in eastern Sudan, for instance, did not follow 
the line drawn by divestment activism nor derived from it; this line had 
been formulated without any communication with those that the activ-
ism was ostensibly standing up for. A dissenting voice was presented 
here, only tentatively, through the viewpoint of a leading oppositional 
figure and the – in this case politically probably inconsequential – infor-
mation that I as a researcher added to this viewpoint. But contextual 
information showed as well that local actors’ discourses were about envir-
onmental protection, higher-level employment, and, more generally, the 
redistribution of wealth in the region. This region, once again, was not 
just formed by some “local people,” but by a multi-scalar landscape of 
elite formation, economic distributional arrangements, and belonging. 
This means that the company was part of pre-existing political struggles, 
not the centre of the political struggle. This is why reversing the perspec-
tive seems so essential when considering CSR: following a company-
centred mapping of the situation will reproduce their priorities, instead 
of analysing and/or allowing for different sets thereof. 
The theoretical and practical implications of this argument are inter-
twined; or, as Gilberthorpe and Rajak call it, they form “both an intellec-
tual and political enterprise” (Gilberthorpe and Rajak 2016: 198). Just as 
the arena that CSR is negotiated in is multi-scalar and multi-positional, 
and should be analysed as such, negotiation positions and communica-
tive processes themselves should be – ideally – empowered as such too. 
Compartmentalisation – for instance into “local,” “national,” and “inter-
national” – is bound to be found wanting and to be silencing, while at-
tempts to reduce a mining site’s context to such compartments calls for 
engaged re-contextualisation (see also, Gilberthorpe and Rajak 2016: 201). 
In this specific case, a differentiated, non-defensive response would 
have looked beyond one local leader towards the representational politics 
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in the region, beyond the media-empowered Darfur conflict into geo-
graphically closer concerns, and beyond abstract notions of environmen-
tal standards into the observations and questions that arose around the 
actual mine itself. In an arena, the corporation is part – and not part and 
parcel – of the geopolitical landscape that calls for CSR in the first place. 
Accordingly, the identification of a corporation’s responsibility should 
not be its own(ed) concern, but rather one of a community of practice 
that reduces disconnection and conflict between actors together forming 
an arena around this common issue. CSR measures should extend at 
least far enough to ensure that such a community can have a meaningful 
existence, according to its own, self-defined benchmarks. 
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Internationale Joint-Ventures im industriellen Goldabbau, unter-
nehmerische Verantwortung und Schadensverursachung im Sudan 
 
Zusammenfassung: Gewaltkonflikte im Sudan, vor allem in Darfur, 
führten zu Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts in den USA zu einem erhöhten 
Druck auf Unternehmen, ihre Investitionen aus dem Sudan abzuziehen 
oder zu beweisen, dass ihre Geschäfte in diesem Land nicht zu den Kon-
flikten beitragen. In dieser Fallstudie von La Mancha, einem Unterneh-
men, das in den Jahren 2006 bis 2015 an einem Goldminen-Joint-Ven-
ture im Sudan beteiligt war, untersuche ich, ob und wie das Unter-
nehmen öffentlich auf diesen Druck reagierte. Ich zeichne nach, wie die 
unternehmerische Verantwortung für anhaltende Schadensverursachung 
in öffentlichen Stellungnahmen des Unternehmens behandelt wurde, 
welche konzeptionelle Lücken darin erkennbar sind, und wie diese in 
USA-basierten Aktivistenkreisen (re)produziert wurden. Die Analyse 
zeigt die selektive Anerkennung von Verantwortung seitens des Unter-
nehmens, welche auf der Perspektive externer Akteure beruht und 
gleichzeitig direkt von Schadensverursachung Betroffene ignoriert. Die 
Fallstudie bezieht sich auf Debatten sozialer Verantwortung von Unter-
nehmen in Afrikas Rohstoffindustrie, insbesondere im Rahmen komple-
xer Unternehmensstrukturen, die sowohl staatliche Akteure als auch 
ausländische Investoren umfassen. Eine solche komplexe Unterneh-
mensstruktur erschwert die Identifizierung von Verantwortungsträgern, 
stellt aber gerade deshalb eine besondere Notwendigkeit dar. Der Artikel 
legt nahe, dass ein Verständnis der Aushandlungsprozesse als Arena, in 
der sich verschiedene Akteure auf das gleiche Anliegen, aber nicht unbe-
dingt aufeinander beziehen, die kommunikative Diskrepanzen innerhalb 
solcher Prozesse konzeptionell erfassen kann.  
 
Schlagwörter: Sudan, Darfur, Goldabbau, lokale Konflikte, Investitions-
politik, Joint Venture, unternehmerische Gesellschaftsverantwortung 
